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Abstract The paper is an account of the development of laboratory experimental
methods in the early 1970s as influenced by the fields of Public Choice and Social
Choice. Just a few key experiments conducted during a period when no experimental
markets research was taking place, provide a bridge with the subsequent, rapid, growth
of experimental economics. A new focus on public goods and externalities, as opposed
to private goods traditionally used in economics experiments, required new repre-
sentations of the commodity space and preference inducement methods. The impor-
tance of voting and collective decision making processes dictated the testing of
equilibrium concepts from political science and cooperative game theory as opposed
to the competitive equilibrium and Nash equilibria found in economics. The existence
of many theories from multiple disciplines required new experimental designs and
experimental tests. The Public Choice and Social Choice emphasis on comparing the
performance of different types of collective decision processes induced early exper-
iments related to institutional design and testing.
Keywords Experiments  Early history  Public choice  Committee experiments
JEL Classification B2  B3  C9  D7  H0  H4
1 Introduction
The introduction of Public Choice topics in the 1970s was a major transition in the
use of laboratory experimental methods as applied to economics and political
science. The transition can be recognized by the change in the focus of laboratory
experiments from private sector phenomena (markets, oligopoly, matrix games), to
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the public sector and by the substantial increase in the number of papers written and
topics explored. The methods changed to encompass a different approach to
experimental methods, a new set of theories, a focus on institutional detail and new
environments as well as a new approach to policy.
The transition took place within a narrow window of time during the first half of
the 1970s when results were produced and disseminated (actual publication of many
results occurred years later due to the long publication lag). At first, it was only me,
my colleagues, and my students guided by my close connection to Public Choice. It
quickly expanded to include other members of the Caltech faculty because several
were interested in Public Choice and to Carnegie Mellon where Public Choice
research was active. After those first few years, the growth was rapid, fueled by
regular meetings of the Public Choice society where results were reported, enhanced
by connections with axiomatic social choice and the decades earlier work on
experimental markets and given visibility by special conferences in 1977 and 1978
where fundamental experimental papers were presented. Subsequently, a renewed
interest in policy, created an overlap and partnership with experimental economics.
The focus this note is on is that narrow window of time and key experiments that set the
stage for the subsequent developments. Public Choice and constitutional political
economy played an indirect, but very important part through the perspective that
Buchanan and Tullock brought to the theory of public sector decisions. The importance of
the ‘‘rules of the process’’ had an enormous influence on the development of laboratory
experimental methods. As someone who was deeply associated with the transition from
the very first, I appreciate the opportunity to report on the subtle ways in which public
choice theory contributed to the basic science and my participation along the way.
2 Background
The relationship between Public Choice and the development of laboratory
experimental methods reflects a natural confluence of events, perspectives, and
methods. In the mid-1960s, a mathematical question posed by Jim Buchanan attracted
my interest and ultimately evolved into a theory that motivated several of the key
experiments. Mr. Buchanan, which is how one addressed him at the University of
Virginia those days, was perplexed by the Samuelson conditions for the Pareto
Optimal provision of public goods. He asked about the conditions for Pareto
optimality in a world that existed of only public goods. The Samuelson conditions
required the existence of a private good held by everyone. It was used to measure the
individual marginal values of the public good, which were then summed. Due to the
absence of a private good, the technical conditions for Pareto optimality in the ‘‘all
public goods’’ case required generalization. In retrospect, one can see that Jim’s
thoughts were exploring the demand side of the provision of public goods.
As a graduate student, I became interested in the problem and managed to solve
it1 and while working on the problem, I noticed that the conditions for Pareto
1 Soon after I developed conditions for Pareto optimality in a world of public goods, I discovered that
similar conditions had been developed years earlier by Frisch (1959).
332 C. R. Plott
123
optimality are closely related to the conditions for a particular notion of voting
equilibrium under unanimity in a world of public goods. A special type of dynamics
was also suggested. The equilibrium notion postulated a process of proposals and
movements in the world of public goods, along directions that would pass the voting
test (not fail a unanimous vote) and would stop at equilibrium when no movement
was possible. The proposal and movement process, which employs a search of the
actions to which participants might agree, is different from the classical Nash model
in which each participant optimizes given the decision function of others. The
gradient of the utility function and directional derivatives became the engines of
decisions as opposed to marginal rates of substitution. Positive votes required
positive increases in utility in the sense that an indifferent individual would vote
‘‘no’’. Of course, an idea of an equilibration process for elections had been used by
Anthony Downs2 and Duncan Black had considered equilibrium for committees,3
but the precise theory I used was new.
Seeing the conditions as characterizing equilibria for one set of voting
institutions (unanimity), my attention turned to the same notion of equilibrium
under other voting rules. Subsequently, I published conditions for a theory of
equilibrium under majority rule in a world of public goods.4 I also considered how
proposals for changes in public goods levels might be found systematically from
among the infinity of possibilities.5 Interestingly, the existence of the equilibrium is
very fragile and the equilibrium disappears with small preference changes or if
private goods are added to the environment. That fragility motivated the
experiments that came later.
3 An invitation for laboratory experimental methods
The connections between public choice and experiments reflect a general, scientific
methodological assumption that leads from theory to experiment. Public choice
theory rests on a set of general principles, much like the laws of supply and demand,
which are assumed to operate independent of time, place, individuals, and many
other variables. The perspective that purposeful and possibly self- interest could
drive public decisions contrasts with the view that public decisions are driven only
by normative views about what is good for society. The public choice perspective,
now more properly viewed as the constitutional political economy perspective,
suggests that an understanding of the public sector can be achieved through a study
of how individualism works within a given set of institutions, as opposed to a study
of alternative philosophies of public preferences that might exist apart from the
preferences of the individual. Public Choice theory is behavioral in the sense that
public decisions are assumed to reflect equilibrating tendencies resulting from the
2 Downs (1957).
3 Black (1958), Black and Newig (1998).
4 Plott (1967a). This paper also contains the results regarding unanimity that first attracted my attention
to the problems.
5 Plott (1967b).
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interactions among individuals and institutions. The theoretical and empirical
challenges are to identify and understand the principles at work.
The behavioral principles of public choice follow the methodological individ-
ualism of economics and are shaped by the interaction of individual preferences and
institutions to determine social choices. The relationship is summarized by a
‘‘fundamental equation’’ that plays a background methodological role in the
development and application of experimental methods.6 The relation is simply:
Preferences  institutions feasible set solutions=equilibrium ) outcomes:
The equation summarizes a hypothesis that the principles that determine public (and
private) sector decisions and outcomes are located in individual preferences over
outcomes, the institutions that control their information, the actions from which
individuals can choose, and the physical environment that limits feasible options.
By including a concept of equilibrium or solution concepts from game theory or
equilibrium concepts from economics and public choice, the outcomes of the both
the private and public sectors can be predicted. Models of markets, politics and
games all fit within the same framework.
Theories reflecting the structure of the fundamental equation are well suited for
experimental methods. The key assumptions of such theories are based on
observables and can be implemented in simple cases for the purposes of study and
testing. (1) The commodity space can be any abstract set of variables. (2) The theory
takes no stand on the sources or shapes of preferences or the reasoning through
which preference might emerge. The theory does not take a stand on why an
individual has a preference. For example, the preference for a shirt could be driven
by a desire to stay warm, the fact someone admired wore something similar, the fact
it might attract a member of the opposite sex or by the possibility that the buyer
wants to eat the shirt. From the point of view of the theory, the structure of the
preference is the important feature. The source of the preference is not important,
except possibly as a tool to facilitate a more accurate specification of the preference
structure and shape. Thus, preferences can be induced using money or any other
reward medium that people like and can have the structure of private goods, private
goods with externalities or public goods.7 (3) The institutions can be markets,
voting, and negotiation or can be more bureaucratic or administrative processes. (4)
Feasibility can be directly controlled. In essence, key parameters can be held
constant while institutions are changed, thereby facilitating a deep understanding of
solutions and equilibrium and related impacts of institutions, the substance of public
6 While elements of the ‘‘fundamental equation’’ are evident in early writings of Public Choice, its
importance as a foundation element in the development of experimental methods was only becoming
recognized as laboratory experimental methods developed. See, Plott (1979). Several papers related to the
development of this period are reprinted in Plott (2001).
7 The demonstration by Grether and Plott (1979) that preference theory could be rejected by ‘‘preference
reversal’’ experiments performed in psychology expanded the study to include a variety of preference
forms together with the possibility that preferences might be endogenous. The Grether and Plott study
was an important step in expanding the study because it clearly demonstrated that preference theory as
found in economics is a rejectable theory, as opposed to tautological and thus, placed the body of theory
on solid scientific footing.
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choice and constitutional political economy. Because the framework applies to both
the public sector and the private sector, the fundamental equation brings a generality
to experimental methods that did not exist before. For example, an experiment can
include private markets but it also can include economic environments where
private markets cannot operate.
The generality of theories as captured by the fundamental equation forms the
rationale and the relevance of laboratory experimental methods. General theories,
by definition, apply to simple and special cases as well as to complex and common
cases. Thus, theory applies with equal force to cases that evolve naturally from
historical events and cases that were created specifically for laboratory testing. The
simple cases that can be created in the laboratory can thus be used to explore the
reliability of the theory and make needed comparisons among competing theories.
Of course, it does not follow that the results from laboratory conditions can be
applied directly to complex, naturally occurring environments in which parameters
are unknown and institutions are possibly different from those induced in the
laboratory. The transfer of laboratory results to field environments is delicate in the
case of public choice, just as it is delicate in the natural sciences.
4 Foundation experiments: identifying principles
Public choice theory suggests relationships among a broad spectrum of institutions
that can be explored and refined through experimental methods. This process of
discovery often begins with specific experimental questions and asks if the data
produced through experiments is consistent with theory, given a best case setting for
the theory. If the theory has empirical content given its best shot, a process of
extension and refinement to other institutions is initiated. While narrow support for
a theory in a specific laboratory environment is part of the experimental method, the
method also looks for similarities across environments as sources of support and
refinement.
4.1 William H. Riker and minimum winning coalitions
If the defining features of public choice and constitutional political economy are the
roles of institutions and self-interest as the driving forces of public sector behavior,
then the first experiments can be attributed to William Riker (Riker 1967; Riker and
Zavoina 1970). His methods and theory were influenced by game theory and the
study of coalitions in games, including experiments in sociology and psychology.
His use of laboratory experimental methods was a natural step towards developing
what he viewed as positive political theory as opposed to a normative approach
based on political philosophy.
His focus was a three person bargaining and coalition formation in a ‘‘divide a
dollar’’ task, a game with transferrable utility. He studied whether or not the theory
of minimal winning coalitions would receive support as opposed to alternative
theories of political behavior based political philosophy and the possible suppres-
sion of self-interest to norms of behavior and group cohesion. He wondered if
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self-interest was a model of behavior that could be considered seriously along with
models based on the psychology, sociology, and attitudes that would be called other
regarding preferences in today’s terminology. He studied negotiations within
political institutions in which a coalition of two agents was sufficient to determine
the allocation in a three person group. His results are the first to demonstrate the
power of the main simple, Von Neumann-Morgenstern solution. His experiments
clearly demonstrated that the principles of minimal winning coalitions could survive
the test of simple environments and in doing so set the stage for the study of more
complex environments.
The contrast of Riker’s experiments with those conducted later is instructive.
When Riker’s experiments were at the formative stage neither the generality of
public choice theory nor modern, laboratory experimental methods had emerged.
The differences between voting theory with public goods and games in character-
istic form were not recognized. Well established distinctions between a game with
transferrable utility, which places a private good into the game, and those without
transferrable utility, had not been fully developed. Riker’s experiments were based
on transferrable utility and thus, the excludability property of private goods, as
opposed to public goods. Similarly, the possibility of inducing preferences for an
abstract pattern of public goods was completely unknown as was the logic that
would motivate such methodology. Riker did not study the detail of voting rules,
and given his parameters majority rule equilibrium did not exist.
Of course, the absence of details that became known later does not detract from
his contribution. His experiments were steps toward introducing experiments with
game theory into political science, and toward demonstrating that positive political
science was possible. In addition, he created a presumption that self-interest and
individual optimizing behavior could play a role in the collective decision process
as opposed to theories based solely on individual’s regards for others. Not only did
he legitimize the question, his results suggested the answer.
4.2 Committee experiments: equilibration
The committee experiments of Fiorina and Plott8 first conducted in the fall of 1972,
represent a transition in substance and methods. The experimental setting was a world of
public goods of the type I had studied theoretically, which differed substantially from
previously conducted experiments with markets and games. In addition, new
experimental methods were developed to accommodate the Fiorina and Plott discovery
that a theory, which was expected to have no explanatory power even under the best of
conditions, is actually very powerful. At the time of the discovery, theories of public
choice were not developed with the precision needed for experimental testing and of
course, no history of similar experiments existed on which to build. New methods were
required to pursue the implications of the discovery.
The new experimental methods developed by Fiorina and Plott reflected hints
found in the experimental methods developed in the early 1960s and used by Smith
to study markets (1962, 1964). Smith employed monetary incentives to induce
8 Fiorina and Plott (1978).
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preferences9 over private goods. However, public goods and associated institutions
differ dramatically from private goods, especially in a world where private goods
and bilateral trades do not exist. The study of committees and public choice required
a substantial generalization of the methodology of induced values in order to
accommodate the wide ranging motivations and institutions that the theory includes.
The methods developed by Smith were based on each person having values for
only a single unit of a single good10 and required that the relationship between
money and the unit exchanged was necessarily quasi linear. The value of the single
unit could only be positive (no satiation). The experiments were based on the
concept of exchange between two people that could take place without the
knowledge or interest of others (no forced consumption and no capacity for multiple
party agreements).
A world of public goods has none of the convenient features that support the use
of experiments with private goods. A new approach to preference inducement was
needed. Not only do institutions and procedures differ from markets, the properties
of preferences that can exist in a world of public goods are completely different
from those that exist in markets. Properties of public goods include multiple units,
negative marginal utilities (public goods are not always good), possible non-convex
preferences and synergies that can lead to complements. Other regarding
preferences, including attitudes or fairness, can be at work. In general, the
inducement methods cannot depend on the existence of the private good needed for
quasi linear utility implementation. In a world of public goods, all individuals
‘‘consume’’ the amount of the goods that exist so the commodity space must be such
that a change in the consumption by one person is accompanied by an identical and
simultaneous consumption change by all. Indeed, considerable research had focused
on the technology and commodity space of public goods, externalities and the
exclusion principle (Meyer and Plott 1975). Furthermore, multiple parties are
participants in changes so institutions require discussions of options so a common
language must exist to support communication about options.
The new experimental methodology is deceptively simple and is illustrated in
Fig. 1. The possible alternatives (the commodity space) are the points in the two
dimensional plane. All preferences are induced for the points on this commodity
space (the plane) which is common to all participants. That is, if the existing option
is some point x on the plane, then all preferences (payoffs) are evaluated at x. For
example, consider a single individual who has the preference induced by the dot at
the far left in Fig. 1(the approximate point is (25,72)). For any individual with the
9 Induced value refers to the use of money to induce preferences for an abstract set of options. The
resulting preferences over abstract options become parameters for models applied to the choice from the
options.
10 Williams (1973) attempted to expand the method to multiple units but could do so only through the use
of a special trading process. Similarly, a 1973 Purdue dissertation by Harvey Reed attempted to study the
two unit case but inadvertently found it necessary to change the trading process. The induced preference
method had not been generalized to deal with multiple markets and certainly not with complements and
substitutes among variables. The issue can be made clear through a comparison of preference inducement
in the market experiments of Smith (1962) and Smith (1964) with the generalization placing value on
marginal changes associated with multiple units in a single market introduced at Plott and Smith (1978),
or the generalization to preference interdependence in multiple markets (Forsythe et al. (1982).
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preference represented by that dot, the point (25,72) is the most preferred alternative
from among all possibilities. If the alternative (25,72) is the group choice then the
individual who has the preference would receive the cash represented by the dot, say
$50.00, which would be known to that individual and no one else. If, for example,
the individual’s preference for alternatives decreases with distance from the
optimal, then the indifference curves would be concentric circles centered on the
optimal. Each indifference curve could be given a label indicating the amount of
money the individual would receive if the group choice is a point on the indifference
curve. So long as the group decisions are restricted to the points on the plane, no
side payments, deals for meeting afterward or physical threats, the individual’s
preferences for the points on the plane are induced and known.
Since the points on the plane are public goods, the ‘‘consumption’’ is the same for
all participants but individual preferences for those points need not be the same. A
point on the plane chosen by the group is the same point for all, and all but different
preferences can be induced for different individuals. That is, if the group choice is
say (40,70), then all participants get the payment indicated by their personal,
induced preference at the point (40,70). The commodity space is common to all
subjects, so all ‘‘consume’’ the same quantity of the public goods, but all can assess
that quantity according to their own value using their private utility map, which can
differ across individuals. Differing preferences induce the natural conflict among
people regarding the choice of the public goods. Notice that the structure does not
depend on the classical notion of a characteristic function from the theory of
cooperative games. The decision by the group is experienced by all and there is no
natural way of punishing those not in a coalition or excluding non-members from
the benefits of a coalition. Thus, the structure of a public goods environment is
different from the structure of a cooperative game without side payments and
without transferrable utility.
Several features are worth note. First, the incentive sheets are independent so
payoffs can be private and the level of payoffs can differ dramatically across
subjects, even with the same preference by simply choosing different monetary
magnitudes to attach to indifference curves. Indeed, while money is convenient, the
source of motivation need not be the same across subjects as long as it is something
that is an adequate, positive reward from the point of view of the subject. Payoffs
need not be convex or continuous. Multiple units of multiple goods can be the
studied. Indifference curves can be any shape desired for purpose of the experiment.
Marginal utilities can be flat, positive or negative, since public goods need not be
good. The public goods can be complements with synergies, substitutes or reflect
lexicographic preferences.
For emphasis, the reader should notice that no private goods exist in the example
in Fig. 1 and that preferences are induced for multiple units of two public goods.
Five people are to choose levels of the two public goods and conflict exists among
them. Prior to this technique, experiments without private goods had not been
conducted and there had been no market experiments with multiple commodities
and multiple units of commodities. Such features were not possible given the
experimental techniques that had been used in economics or in political science.
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The new environment and theory created new challenges that Fiorina and Plott
met by changes in the experimental techniques but also changes in the application of
and logic of experimental methodology. The traditional experimental methodology
of theory testing and rejection seemed incapable of moving the theory in useful ways.
The abstractness and fragility of the theory combined with the absence of operational
constraints and institutional detail made the theory a trivial target for rejection. It was
easy to imagine experiments in which the theory could be rejected. Other general
theories of group decisions found in psychology and game theory were similarly
vague or incomplete and thus suffered from the same vulnerability. Simple theory
rejection seemed to give little insight about any explanatory power that might exist
and how it might be improved by experimental methods. The methodology of
‘‘theory test’’ experiments relied on the existence of theories that were much more
precise than the public choice and political theories available at the time.
The challenges were overcome through two methodological changes. First, the
experimental approach was inverted from the traditional ‘‘theory first’’ method to a
‘‘data/phenomena’’ first method. The traditional approach starts with theory,
implements experimental controls that satisfy the conditions of the theory, and then
Fig. 1 a Preference parameters five person. b majority rule committee decisions
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asks whether or not the theory is true or false. By contrast, the Fiorina and Plott
approach started with an experimental environment constructed to study simple
cases of phenomena that public choice theories were attempting to explain. The
logic that supported the use of experiments was simple and directed by the
‘‘fundamental equation’’. General theories should work in simple and special cases.
The purpose of an experiment is to take a look and assess what, if any, of the
phenomena the model captures. The idea is that if the models fail to ‘‘work
adequately’’ in the easiest cases, then one would not expect them to work to explain
more complex cases. On the other hand, success when applied to the easy is an
invitation to explore theory generalization and increasing experimental complexity.
Given the experimental environment, the second methodological change was an
empirical focused on which of several models might produce the best explanation for
the data, even though the experimental controls might not meet the assumptions of
any of the models. It is a contest among theories as opposed to the test of a theory and
allowed research to expand as guided by the most promising models while remaining
consistent with a set of basic principles. The phenomena chosen for study were the
decisions of committees that operated with specific, well defined rules in which
participants had well-formed preferences about a set of options without uncertainties
and without information about the preferences of others. Multiple models reasonably
could be applied to such an experiment so rather than studying the prediction of one
theory, they computed the predictions of many theories. The question was changed
from ‘‘is the theory true’’ to ‘‘which theory/model best explains the data’’,11 and how
the model might be improved. This change required developing a technique for
determining the ‘‘best’’ from among several competing theories.
The mathematical elegance of equilibrium theory suggested that generalizations
were possible but such generalizations would not be of interest if the equilibrium
theory could not work under the best of conditions. Scientific interest in the theory
and any of its generalizations would be dictated by the experimental results as
opposed to its logic or potential applications that might be imagined. That was a
new type of argument that flowed directly from the methodology implicit in the
fundamental equation. In addition, the public goods environment permitted
experiments that simultaneously tested many competing theories12 and also set
the stage for the study of the broad range of public choice institutions and theory
that exist outside the world of private goods and markets.
The Fiorina and Plott experiments and subsequent extensions, demonstrate the
existence of an equilibration process in voting groups. Figure 1a contains an
illustration with five voters and circular indifference curves centered at a dot
encircled by a typical indifference curve. The world is one with only public goods.
A unique voting equilibrium exists at the maximum for the individual located at the
11 The approach is influenced by Bayesian methods in the sense that it is not meaningful to reject a theory
without having an alternative. However, the absence of a theory of error structure presented a special
challenge.
12 The Fiorina and Plott experiment tested sixteen competing behavioral models within the single
experimental setting. Several of the theories were found in the social psychology and sociology literature.
Others were found in the political science literature and still others were found in the Public Choice and
Economics literatures.
340 C. R. Plott
123
interior of the Pareto Optimal points. Early experimental work focused on both the
voting procedures and the underlying structure of the alternatives. If the voting
follows a form of Roberts Rules of Order and if underlying set of alternatives has a
spatial structure in which the equilibrium exists, then the committee decisions
accumulate near the equilibrium as shown in Fig. 1b. The tendency of equilibration
illustrated in the figure has been replicated many times and under a variety of
preference configurations. The experiments demonstrate that a principle of
equilibration exists in such environments.
The discovery that an equilibration tendency could be observed in an
experimental environment led to an explosion of ideas even though the equilibration
had been observed in only a narrow class of environments. The result suggested the
need for many different experiments to explore the robustness of the phenomena
and the sensitivity to institutions. The broad ranges of public choice questions were
immediately open. The implications the fundamental equation are unbounded and
new possibilities were exposed. Figure 2 contains a self-explanatory map of
experiments proposed in the Fiorina and Plott proposal to the National Science
Foundation developed in the summer and fall of 1973 and submitted late that fall.13
It is interesting to note that a large part of the proposed research was related to
experimental procedures and methods. However, an equally large part was focused
on institutions, which clearly reflected the influence of Jim Buchanan and what
would be latter be called the constitutional political economy strand of Public
Choice research.
Of course, the fragility of existence of the equilibrium was an invitation to theory
refinement and additional experiments. Fiorina and Plott studied the case where no
equilibrium exists by moving the maximum of the person at the equilibrium in
Fig. 1a slightly down and to the right. The outcomes in the resulting non-
equilibrium experiments found a clustering of outcomes similar to the equilibrium
experiments, albeit the outcome cluster of the non-equilibrium experiments was
broader than the equilibrium experiments. Nevertheless, the outcomes were not
scattered throughout the possibilities and thus, suggested the existence of some as
yet unformulated equilibrium/solution concept. None of the existing theories
worked well to predict what happens, a fact that created a challenge.14
13 The initial experiments were all funded by an earlier NSF grant to C. Plott. By the spring of 1973,
many of the Fiorina and Plott experiments were completed and the research was focused on new
directions.
14 The case of non-equilibrium was not studied until after September 1973 when the first agenda
experiments were conducted. Both Mo and I wanted to do the non-equilibrium environment but could not
find a justification in terms of an understanding for what would be learned. In frustration, Mo asserted ‘‘If
we move the equilibrium and if the data just follow the maximum of the interior person, it would be very
embarrassing.’’ That comment together with the agenda theory, which had just been exposed by the flying
club exercise of Plott and Levine (1978), supplied a theory. If the agent in the center proposed his/her
maximum at some point, a plausible agenda step exits that could lead to the point. Thus, the agenda
experiments provided a theory about what might be expected if the equilibrium did not exist. It was the
justification we were seeking and the experiments were conducted. Interestingly, exactly why we were
excited about the research was not obvious to everyone. Vernon Smith arrived at Caltech in the fall of
1973 and, after observing what Mo and I we were doing, asked me in a somewhat rhetorical tone, why we
were doing such research, which was obviously dramatically different from what had taken place in
economics and made little sense to him at the time. Mo and I knew that we were going to have a difficult
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What theory describes outcomes when the equilibrium does not exist? Many
theories and tests have emerged over the intervening decades. Indeed, all branches
of Fig. 2 have been explored and continue to be explored. Among the first that
attempted to replicate the Fiorina and Plott results and generalize the theory to cover
the cases of non- equilibrium was developed by Richard McKelvey and Peter
Fig. 2 Induced preferences for two public goods and experimental outcomes for majority rule choice of
public goods
Footnote 14 continued
time explaining what we were doing to a very skeptical audience. Vernon’s comment suggested that it
would be harder than we anticipated. Except for those very close to public economics and public choice
the source of excitement and curiosity was not obvious.
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Ordeshook15 who also explored parliamentary procedures such as an accumulation
of amendments and associated votes before voting on a single motion. Their model
draws heavily on classical cooperative game theory in which coalition formation is
a central feature of group decision. Like Riker, the McKelvey and Ordeshook,
‘‘competitive solution’’ has coalitions forming and coordinating to achieve a
purpose while minimizing concessions to those whose agreement is not needed for
achieving the goal. As a prediction, the competitive solution presents a challenge in
terms of uniqueness but in the experiments for which clear predictions could be
deduced, the data follow the patterns predicted. 16
4.3 Alternative voting rules: the power of veto
The Fiorina and Plott results suggest that successful models focus on winning and
blocking coalitions in relation to pairs of alternatives. That fact is clear in retrospect
now, after decades of experiments. The principle that operates can be seen in the
power of the veto. An alternative x dominates an alternative y if a winning coalition
unanimously prefers x to y. A blocking coalition is a subset of all winning coalitions
and thus, has ‘‘veto power’’ in the sense that x does not dominate y if the blocking
coalition is not unanimous for x over y. The outcomes predicted by the model are
the undominated alternatives, which always exists if blocking coalitions exists.17
Unanimity as a voting rule places all voters in the position of a veto player. No
doubt this is the feature that made the process attractive for Buchanan. His
continuous exploration of such rules over the years served to give the method of
unanimity high priority in experiments. Figure 3 adapts the environment typically
used in the study of majority rule by a simple change of the voting rule from
majority rule to unanimity. The status quo from the majority rule committees is
retained as are the other procedures. The only change is that the final vote and
amendments to a motion on the floor must be accepted by a unanimous vote as
opposed to a majority. The notion of equilibrium used in majority is also defined in
terms of a point from which no change can receive the needed vote. The set of
equilibria under unanimity is the set of Pareto Optimal options according to the
equilibrium notion that emerged from my first examination of the world of all public
goods. The data are shown in the Fig. 3. All outcomes are in the set of Pareto
optima. Inefficient decisions are never made. Interestingly, the data are clustered
near the center of the Pareto Optima.18 The reason for the attraction to the center is
unknown. While the default outcome is important, both fairness and expectations
about what others might accept are speculations about the underlying principle that
operates.
15 Berl et al. (1976).
16 McKelvey and Ordeshook (1978). See also, Laing and Olmsted (1978).
17 Early experiments pitted a Von Neumann–Morgenstern solution against the core. The issue was
whether the VM solution captured data that the core would not. In particular, the experiments are asking if
coalition theories had predictive power over equilibrium theories. If the committee operates by rules
similar to Robert’s Rules, the answer is no.
18 See Levine and Plott (1977) and Plott and Levine (1978).
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The power of the general model and the central role of the concept of
blocking, is easily illustrated by committees that operate under closed rule, in which
a specific individual or subcommittee has the power to prevent votes on
alternatives.19 However, that individual or subcommittee cannot implement any
alternative unless joined by a majority. The members of such a subgroup are viewed
as ‘‘veto players’’ in the sense that x cannot be chosen over y if the coalition of veto
players does not unanimously prefer x over y. In the language of the theory, y is not
dominated by x. A set of alternatives that has the property of being ‘‘undominated’’,
the core of an appropriately defined cooperative game without side payments, tends
to attract the outcomes of committee choices.
In Fig. 4, the individual at the right of the figure has the power to prevent votes
on any proposal but cannot make proposals and a proposal on which a vote is
allowed cannot win unless it is accepted by a majority of those voting. The voter is a
veto player. The majority rule equilibrium without the veto player is the point in the
center of the Pareto Optima as was represented in Fig. 1a. But, if a veto player
exists, as is the case in Fig. 4, the core of a social choice game without side
payments, the undominated alternatives, are those that exist on the line connecting
the majority rule equilibrium and the maximum for the veto player. The dots in the
figure are the actual committee choices in experiments. As can be seen, the
committee choices are scattered in the direction of the core. Thus, the shift to what
is effectively the closed rule also shifts the equilibrium from the single point to the
line segment. Notice that the undominated options, the core, become an effective
model of committee choices. The use of veto players can be extended to capture
complex political systems and experiments support the model as effectively
predicting group choice. It is important to note that if the set of options contains
cycles, the most preferred alternative of the veto player is always in the core and if
the cycles are sufficiently numerous the core shrinks to the optimum of the veto
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Fig. 3 Outline of possible experiments motivated by the Fiorina and Plott results
19 The closed rule was first studied experimentally in Isaac and Plott (1978).
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player. In that sense, the veto player has considerable power. That fact also answers
a long-standing question about the absence of observed cycles in ongoing political
systems. If veto players exist, then an equilibrium always exists. This fact also
addresses questions about the fragility of the majority rule equilibrium. Frequently
observed institutional features of systems can add stability to the system.
4.4 Agenda theory and design as a method and purpose
The results from spatially embedded committee processes operating under versions
of Roberts Rule suggest optimism that general principles from cooperative game
theory operate to determine the outcomes of all committee processes. Unfortunately,
agenda theory dashes such hopes. While the core of the appropriate game is an
extremely powerful model for some environments, the agenda experiments
demonstrate that the power does not extend to all environments.
An agenda is a sequence of partitions of the alternatives produced by a series of
agenda questions. For example, if the set of options is {A,B,C,D}, the first question
could pose a choice between the sets {A,B} and {C,D}. The second question would
apply to the chosen set and ask which of the two options will be selected as a final
choice. Language is sufficiently versatile to induce very natural sounding agenda.
For example, the proposal to ‘‘consider the extremes first’’ pits the set {A,D} against
the set {B,C}. The outcome of the deliberations will differ according to the
sequence of proposals. Agenda theory suggests that the alternative finally selected
can be substantially determined by a properly designed agenda. It is important to
recognize that this power of the agenda is unrelated to voting cycles.
The theory of the agenda and the power of the agenda to influence groups was
first discovered by Plott and Levine. They developed and explored the topic in both
experimental environments and in a field application in which a large flying club
was influenced to buy a fleet of planes preferred by the person in charge of the
agenda.20 The application had two impacts. First, it demonstrated the power of
Fig. 4 Closed rule—majority rule with a veto player
20 See Levine and Plott (1977) and Plott and Levine (1978).
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public motivated theories when applied to complex, ‘‘real world’’ controversies and
the central role of experiments in such applications. Secondly, it changed the
institutions on which the theory was focused.
The fact that the influence of the agenda does not depend on voting cycles is
underlined by the fact that it can exert systematic influence even when all members
of the group have the same preference over alternatives. According to theory, the
agenda works by keeping voters in the dark at every stage, not revealing what might
be the outcome of the vote in subsequent stages and preventing discussions and
straw votes that reveal what might happen in subsequent stages. Voters tend to be a
bit random between being optimistic, expressing their preference for the set with
their most preferred option, and pessimistic, voting against the set that contains their
least preferred. The predictable randomness together with any diversity of prefer-
ences that might exist in the group, can be used to fashion the agenda such that at
each stage of voting the options not preferred by the agenda designer are eliminated.
The objective is to have only the option preferred by the designer remains after the
voting.
Thus, agenda experiments demonstrate that the undominated alternatives that are
such a powerful model in the spatial environment with Roberts Rules of Order
cannot be applied with abandon to predict group choices. The agenda theories
demonstrate that naturally appearing agenda, if imposed, can induce voting groups
to choose almost anything. Thus, procedures can be used to cause outcomes to be
different from the core or any other game solution.
Agenda research also created a methodological advancement for experimental
research. In particular, the research introduced the methodology of design in which
the research purpose is not only the testing of theory but is also asking if institutions
can be designed to serve some purpose and if so, what might be the role of
experiments. Clearly, the power of institutional design was known to public choice
and axiomatic social choice scholars long before the modern theory of mechanism
design was introduced. Indeed, the constitutional political economy strand of public
choice emerged because of an understanding of the power of institutional choice.
The key steps to creating a useful methodology were used by Levine and Plott.
In today’s language, the steps are: (1) Does the mechanism do what it is
supposed to do—proof of principle; and (2) Does it do it for the right reasons—
those that led to the design—design consistency. That approach was explicitly used
in explaining the role of the agenda experiments.
4.5 Externalities and public goods provision: efficiency measures
and the intersection of public and private sectors
In a world of only public goods, no efficiency measures exist other than Pareto
Optimality and if the institutions contain veto players the outcomes will tend to be
Pareto Optimal. Measures of gains from trade require a private good and thus the
efficiency measurement of institutional performance in an experiment requires a
private good. The modern measurement of efficiency in an experiment was
discovered and applied to classical market environments by Plott and Smith (1978).
Their measure of efficiency is the total gains from trade—the actual money gained
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by participants as a group divided by the highest total possible. Their measure
allows experiments to assess the extent of ‘‘market failures’’ and responses to
institutional changes. And, it can do so even if the theory responsible for the
institutional impact is not understood. This insight allows assessment of institutions
based on experiments even when the theoretical implications of competing
institutions is not fully understood.
Subsequent experiments demonstrated that markets can operate at near 100 %
efficiency in this sense, which stimulated the broad expansion of experiments on
policy and market related institutional design.
Two primary theories of market failure, externalities and public goods, are often
used to motivate public policy. Both follow from the hypothesis that preferences
need not be ‘‘other regarding’’. Externalities lead to market failure if people do not
incorporate the damage done to others by their private behavior. Public goods
provision fails because of the possibility of free riders, again a type of
unresponsiveness to the preferences of others. Whether or not market failures
actually exist or what might be done if failures do exist, depend on what is accepted
about the pattern of preferences and the behaviors that follow. Neither introspection
about own preferences nor historical examples seemed to produce evidence
supporting generalization. Data are needed.
Very early experiments demonstrated that externalities produced in a market
environment induced behavior substantially as theory predicted.21 Subjects
participated in a traditional double auction but every trade by any trader created a
penalty imposed on all others. The trade undertaken by any pair of participants
created an externality (the penalty was a cost per unit traded by anyone in the
market—a social cost) that applied to all others as soon as the trade took place. The
insight and experimental methodology was developed from the methods developed
to study committees merged with the methods used to study markets. The markets
with externalities converged to the same competitive equilibrium as would have
been the case if no externality had been imposed. Because failure to trade can be
interpreted as a contribution to the public good of penalty (social cost) reduction, the
trades themselves can be interpreted as the failure to contribute to the provision of
the public good. Thus, those who traded in the externality environment can be
viewed as first ‘‘free riders’’ and a demonstration of the free rider phenomena related
to the theory of public goods. Experimental variations, imposing a tax and creating a
permit corrected the externality as expected, raising efficiencies to near 100 %,
using the Plott-Smith measure of efficiency. The results have remained
uncontroversial.
Research related to the provision of public goods emerged from multiple
literatures with different presumptions about the problem, different methodologies
and different theories. In all cases, the initial experiments suggest that public goods
provisions are not characterized by total free riding and that the problem might not
be as severe as theory suggests. Perhaps the first was Peter Bohm who approached
21 Plott (1983). The paper was circulated as: Social Science Working Paper 180, California Institute of
Technology, 1978. As was typical of experimental papers in those days it took years to get research
published.
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the issue as a measurement problem and investigated the willingness of individuals
to pay to watch a TV program.22 Different questions and circumstances were
examined. His general conclusion was the people are more willing to contribute
than the literature would lead you to believe.
Psychologist, Robin Dawes and colleagues initiated other experiments they
interpreted as social dilemmas. A variety of institutions had unanticipated effects on
contributions to a public good.23 Group size, feedback, and instructions were varied
in an attempt to find conditions that influence group contributions. While
individuals had a dominate strategy to free ride, contributions persisted at
significant, but inefficient, levels that could be influenced by procedures.
Sociologists Gerald Marwell and Ruth Ames also conducted experiments24 with
the same overall pattern of results. Under the conditions of those experiments,
people do not simply start free riding and stay there.
Economists attracted to the public goods problem seemed to start with the
presumption that free riding would be frequent, if not pervasive, and concentrated
on institutions and ‘‘mechanisms’’ that would induce the group to implement the
optimal levels of public goods. Ferejohn et al. explored a mechanism to induce
payments for public broadcasting programs.25 Vernon Smith examined several
mechanisms for public goods provision.26
The studies of public goods provision mechanisms produced levels far above the
zero level predicted by free riding. However, these studies lacked any baseline that
would establish the levels of public good provision that would occur in the absence
of the mechanism. In fact, substantial free riding on public goods provision had
never been observed. The public goods provision mechanism studies demonstrated a
possible solution to a problem that might not exist. Experiments were needed that
could establish conditions under which free riding will be observed, if indeed such
conditions exist. Interestingly, even after years of theory that assumed the pervasive
existence of free riding in the provision of public goods, the phenomena had not
been experimentally observed.
A substantial research gap existed. Theory predicted the existence of free riding.
Public goods provision mechanisms were constructed on the presumption that free
riding needed correction. Yet, free riding had not been observed and a body of
opinion existed that suggested that free riding is against human nature and thus,
would never exist. The experimental gap was filled by two studies focused on
sufficient conditions to get free riding. Isaac, McCue, and Plott were the first to
observe public goods free riding. Their experiments were motivated by intuition
drawn from the public choice literature and behavior observed in markets with
externalities. They studied an environment with different, declining values for a
22 Bohm (1972).
23 Dawes (1975), Dawes et al. (1977).
24 Marwell and Ames (1979), Marwell and Ames (1980), Marwell and Ames (1981).
25 Ferejohn et al. (1979).
26 Plott and Smith (1978); Smith (1979); Smith (1980).
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public good that must be sustained by repeated contributions.27 Kim and Walker
followed quickly and observed free riding in a similar environment.28 In both cases,
initial high levels of contributions declined rapidly to very low levels of
contribution, which can be interpreted as free riding with occasional ‘‘pulses’’ in
contributions as isolated individuals attempted to solve a problem what was
oblivious to them but could do nothing about.
These studies set the stage for tests of institutional solutions by discovering
environments in which the natural level of public goods provision is low, thereby
giving institutions a substantial hurdle to overcome. In the language used now, these
environments can be used to ‘‘stress test’’ newly designed public goods provision
mechanisms. The question posed was whether or not new types of institutions
suggested by the Public Choice approach would successfully improve public goods
provision in environments where public goods provision would not otherwise take
place. In the decades that followed, the experimental study of public goods
mushroomed.
4.6 Policy application of laboratory methods: institutions for airport access
Experimental methods in public choice passed another important landmark with the
first application to an active policy issue29 that took place during the process of
airline deregulation in the mid-1970s. The background of the application was based
on the development of agenda theory and the application to the flying club, which
had proved feasibiltiy of laboratory based policy research.
Airport’s access at four major airports was controlled by committees, ‘‘slot
committees’’, populated by the airlines that operated at the airport. The traditional
function of these committees was coordinating the arrivals and departures of
aircraft, the time ‘‘slots’’. The number and general pattern of slots were authorized
by the Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB). Historically, the CAB allocated the rights to
operate over routes, the scheduling of operations and setting of rates. Deregulation
would remove CAB authority leaving the slot committees as the process for
determining airport access. The CAB was concerned that the committees could
function as a barrier to entry and perhaps also as a facilitating device for deeper anti-
competitive activities. The power of the procedures used by the committees had
been fully demonstrated by the Levine and Plott flying club example.
27 In essence, the needed conditions were already known from the behavior of markets with externalities.
A reduction in consumption or production of an external diseconomy is a contribution to the public good
of external diseconomy reduction. Such contributions were not forthcoming in the externality
experiments of Plott (1983) so the issue just turned on understanding the relationship between a positive
contribution to the public good and the restraint of making a contribution to a public bad.
28 Isaac et al. (1985), Kim and Walker (1984).
29 An earlier policy application in economics was a paper by Hong and Plott (1982) who conducted a
study on rate posting for the U.S. Department of Transportation. That study had an effect on the policy
but the DOT did not publish the study due to the fear that Senator Proxmire would grant the DOT his
‘‘Golden Fleece’’ award for wasteful spending. Interestingly, the long delay in the publication of this first
application is not an isolated example of the difficulties getting early experimental work published.
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The CAB commissioned a study of the slot committees to determine how the
committees functioned and to explore alternatives to the committees.30 The
committees used the rule of unanimity to make decisions. The process started with
proposals based historical allocations followed by concessions and changes
proposed by the individual carriers. The report studied the committee procedures,
deliberations, and decisions. From the study, it became clear that committee
members believed that in the event of a failure to reach unanimity, the allocation of
slots would be a political process that could involve members of Congress. It was
also believed that the default process would exert pressure on the large carriers to
make slots available to new airline entrants and to smaller carriers.
The analysis of the slot committees involved experiments with committees
operating under conditions similar to the slot committees and also involved
experiments with recommended alternatives. The purpose of the experiments was to
illustrate the nature of the underlying principles at work under the committee
processes. Specifically, if the default is equal splits, then the core of unanimity
voting game includes equal splits. The implication for committees with a pattern of
initial endowment similar to the existing airline endowments is unambiguous. The
larger holders give up slots to smaller participants.
This implies that committee-based allocation can substantially reduce efficiency
by inducing large, efficient holders to give up slots to small, inefficient holders. By
contrast, efficiency calls for the efficient holders to grow in size while inefficient
holders shrink. The committee experiments demonstrated the power of the core
through experiments that manipulated endowments and efficiency and demonstrated
that the committee choice was dictated only by the equilibrium. The process had no
sensitivity to any dimension of efficiency.
Examination of data from multiple years of slot committee decisions demon-
strated that the slots held by the large carriers were eroding over time. The slots
given up by large carriers were transferred to new entrants. Committee discussions
recorded as part of the study found a similar process as small carriers and midsized
carriers, who had no interest in giving up slots to small carriers, pressured and
threatened the larger carriers with the prospect that the larger carriers could suffer
greater losses than those required to facilitate a unanimous choice. The fact that the
larger carriers almost never grew and the smaller entrants were never denied a few
slots suggested that the actual allocations were characterized by the inefficiencies
predicted by theory and experimental evidence. Comparisons of experimental
results to the actual committee decisions suggested that the same principles were at
work in both places. Once the core was understood, its applicability became
obvious.
The carriers immediately lost faith in the committees. The study recommended
that the slots be auctioned or that existing carriers be grandfathered with slots
bought and sold. The latter system ultimately replaced the committee system. The
experimental auctions are of interest as the first combinatorial auctions and
approached the allocation as a sequence of auctions.
30 Grether et al. (1979). The report was subsequently published as a book: Grether et al. (1989).
350 C. R. Plott
123
The application to an on-going, politically charged policy issue demonstrated that
the laboratory results could be (carefully) applied outside the laboratory and
demonstrated by example of how that can be done when the scale is large and
visible. The data from the laboratory related to theory in much the same way that
data from the field related to theory. The theory itself made sense and was readily
accepted by those close to the policy issue. Furthermore, the application established
the capacity of the laboratory methods to withstand public scrutiny. That issue of
institutional design would be present in the first policy application of laboratory
methods is not surprising. The design of institutions was a public choice theme from
the beginning. Institutional comparisons were natural as was the use of efficiency
measures as a norm of comparison.
5 The decades that followed
The first years of the 1970s were almost completely dominated by Public Choice
experiments and were heavily influenced by theories of committees and social
choice processes. A merger of public choice experiments with market experiments
begins slowly in 1974 when Vernon Smith visited Caltech (1973/74) and then
rapidly advances with new experiments applied to market uncertainty (Plott and
Wilde (1982), information (Plott and Sunder (1982, 1988), time interdependence
(Forsythe et al. 1982) and institutions. Similarities in the importance of institutions
in both markets and public choice (e.g. Nash equilibria and core—like principles
together with their limitations) began to be recognized. At the same time, a second
merger was taking place between public choice experiments and axiomatic social
choice. The merger took axioms used to explore philosophies of social preference
and reconstructed them in terms of the behavioral concept of a dominance relation
of cooperative games without side payments. The new tools from social choice
theory added solution concepts from cooperative game theory without side
payments and facilitated the inclusion of institutions without the complicating
detail required by non-cooperative games and Nash equilibrium (Plott 1976).
By the beginning of the 1980s, the interrelated disciplines of economics, political
science, and public choice had a solid laboratory experimental foundation. Key
principles had been established. The methodology of design and experimental
testing as a policy exercise was understood and successfully applied. The few
examples convincingly demonstrated that the basic research could ultimately
produce value in applications. The avalanche of research in the following decades
was clearly anticipated by the early period of work. Public Choice and constitutional
political economy remain at the center of the scientific developments.
The development of experiments in the early 1970s was driven by curiosity about
the power of institutions to shape collective choice, much of which was stimulated
by the work of James Buchanan and Gordon Tullock together with the broad issues
of public choice and political science. Paradoxically, in spite of his influence,
experiments did not move to study Buchanan’s major interest: constitutional choice.
How will individuals design and choose institutions and will participation in that
process influence their behavior? The early experiments were narrowly focused on
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behavior within institutions given a fixed set of options and well-formed individual
preferences.
Institutional preferences motivated by self-interest are understood and can be
observed as individuals manipulate institutional designs to advance personal ends.
However, the deep questions about the principles of behavior that operate at the
level of constitutional choice remain open. The time and cost of such experiments
might be a challenge, but intellectual and scientific promise loom large. How might
an experiment avoid the regress of institutions to choose institutions? What
preferences should be induced and what is the role of uncertainty? The thoughts of
Jim Buchanan and the blossoming field of Constitutional Political Economy include
many hypotheses about what the answers might be.
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